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On Overreaching, or Why Rick Perry May Save the Voting
Rights Act but Destroy Affirmative Action
Ellen D. Katz
ABSTRACT
The State of Texas is presently staking out two positions that are not typically pursued by a single litigant. On
the one hand, Texas is seeking the invalidation of the Voting Rights Act, and, on the other, the State is now
defending the validity of the expansive race-based affirmative action policy it uses at its flagship university.
This Essay presses the claim that Texas has increased the chance it will lose in both Texas v. Holder andFisher
v. University of Texas because it has opted to stake out markedly extreme positions in each. I argue that Texas
would be more likely to succeed had it chosen to temper both its actions and claims in the pending cases.
As it stands, Texas’s assertive stance in Fisher promises to bolster the aversion many Justices already feel
towards affirmative action. With regard to the VRA, however, Texas’s uncompromising approach to the
regime may prove to be the VRA’s best defense. As recent redistricting and voter ID decisions suggest,
Texas’s stance may be provide what is arguably better evidence for why the statute remains necessary
than anything proffered by the VRA’s many supporters. Indeed, the State’s aggressively hostile stance
towards the VRA has the potential to destabilize judicial misgivings about the statute, and, if not fully
reverse them, postpone their implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Supporters of race-based affirmativeaction tend to think the federal Voting Rights
Act (VRA) continues to do important work, while
opponents of the VRA generally view affirmative
action as obsolete. The State of Texas, however, is
presently defying this rule. In Texas v. Holder, the
State is seeking a declaration that Section 5 of the
VRA is unconstitutional,1 while, in Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, Texas is defending the
race-based affirmative action policy it uses at its
flagship university.2 In other words, Texas is posit-
ing both a continuing need for state-initiated, race-
based affirmative action and the obsolescence of
the VRA’s race-based structuring of the electoral
process.
Texas’s stance in these cases is generally viewed
as untenable; the State’s defense of affirmative
action is expected to fail and the challenge to the
VRA is thought likely to succeed.3 This prediction
reflects the widespread belief that judicial antipathy
to expansive civil rights enforcement will override
refined distinctions regarding the source of regula-
tory power.4 Considerable evidence supports this
suspicion, making it possible, and indeed probable,
Ellen D. Katz is a professor of law at the University of Michigan
Law School in Ann Arbor, MI.
1First Amended Expedited Complaint for Declaratory Judg-
ment, Texas v. Holder, Case No 1:12 CV-00128-RMC-DST-
RLW, Mar. 12, 2012.
2132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting certiorari); see also Brief in
Opposition, 2011 WL 6146835 (Dec. 7, 2011).
3See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Other Big Supreme Court Case,
New Yorker, May 1, 2002; Richard L. Hasen, Holder’s Vot-
ing Rights Gamble, Slate, Dec. 30, 2011.
4See generally Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation:
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 Mich.
L. Rev. 2341 (2003).
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that the realm of permissible civil rights regulation
will be considerably smaller once Texas is finished
litigating both cases.
In this essay, I explore the possibility of a differ-
ent outcome. More specifically, I consider the pros-
pect that the courts involved will hold that
the Constitution permits Congress to reauthorize
the VRA even as it prevents non-remedial, state-ini-
tiated, race-based affirmative action of the sort
Texas practices at the University of Texas (UT).
Put differently, the essay explores the likelihood
that Texas has it backwards.
I am not calculating odds here. Nor will I defend
the quite defensible contention that congressional
power to frame the VRA pursuant to its enforce-
ment powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments exceeds Texas’s discretion to craft
and implement its state-based affirmative action
plan within the confines of the Equal Protection
Clause.5 Instead, the essay presses the claim that
Texas has increased the chance it will lose both
cases by opting to stake out markedly extreme posi-
tions in each. My claim is that Texas would be more
likely to succeed than it now is had it chosen to tem-
per both its actions and claims in the pending cases.
As it stands, Texas’s assertive stance in Fisher
promises to bolster the aversion many Justices
already feel towards affirmative action.6 True, the
present Supreme Court would be unlikely to look
kindly on any race-based admissions plan. Still,
the Justices might well have declined review in
Fisher had the Texas plan more closely tracked
the plan the Court upheld in its 2003 decision, Grut-
ter v. Bollinger.7 Instead, the plan is, in notable
ways, more expansive and aggressive than was the
Michigan program, and a lower court decision
upholding it attracted the Justices’ attention.
In Holder, the State’s aggressive stance promises
to be consequential as well, but in a different way.
The VRA is undeniably vulnerable, with numerous
judges having already expressed considerable
skepticism about the ongoing need for the stat-
ute’s regional, remedial provisions.8 Still, Texas’s
uncompromising approach to the regime may
prove to be the VRA’s best defense. As recent deci-
sions regarding voter ID and redistricting suggest,9
Texas’s stance provides what is arguably better evi-
dence for why the statute remains necessary than
anything proffered by the VRA’s many supporters.
Indeed, the State’s aggressively hostile stance
towards the VRA has the potential to destabilize
judicial misgivings about the statute, and, if not
fully reverse them, postpone their implementation.
Time will tell, of course, whether Texas’s strat-
egy will have this effect or instead achieve what
the state officials involved hope. But if the VRA
should survive the pending challenges, those of us
inclined to celebrate should remember to thank
Texas for its contribution to the cause. A more mea-
sured stance might have easily secured the VRA’s
invalidation. Aggressively pursuing the statute’s
demise may prove to be the best hope for its survival.
II. TESTING LIMITS
Texas is presently staking out two positions that
are not typically pursued by a single litigant. On
the one hand, Texas seeks the invalidation of the
Voting Rights Act, and, short of that, the adoption
of several decidedly narrow constructions of the
statute. Meanwhile, the State has adopted and is
now defending the validity of the expansive race-
based affirmative action policy it uses at its flagship
university. Linking these divergent positions is the
aggressive way in which they challenge the outer
limits of existing doctrine.
A. Constraining the VRA
Texas decided to challenge the constitutionality
of the VRA after the Department of Justice (DOJ)
blocked the State from implementing the voter iden-
tification law the legislature enacted and Governor
Perry signed in 2011.10 As a covered jurisdiction
under the VRA, Texas must obtain federal approval,
known as preclearance, before it can implement any
changes to its electoral practices.11 Having been
rebuffed by DOJ, Texas went to federal court,
5See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 997 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See also Katz, supra note 4.
6See Toobin, supra note 3.
7539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8See Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009); id. at 216–229 (Thomas,
J., concurring); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 492 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 679 F.3d
848, 885 (D.C.C. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting).
9See Texas v. Holder, 2012 WL 3743676 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2012); Texas v. United States, 2012 WL 3671924 (D.D.C.
Aug. 28, 2012).
10See First Amended Complaint, Texas v. Holder, supra note 1.
1142 U.S.C. x 1973.
ON OVERREACHING 421
claiming that its voter ID law is entitled to preclear-
ance under the VRA, and, to the extent that it is not,
that the VRA itself is unconstitutional.12
The constitutional challenge to the VRA is a
familiar one, having been raised both in previous lit-
igation and in other pending cases, one of which is
now pending before the Supreme Court.13 In brief, it
posits that contemporary conditions no longer jus-
tify subjecting states to the preclearance require-
ment, a stringent measure originally enacted a half
century ago to address massive African-American
disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow South.14
Texas makes a claim of this sort in Holder, adding
a few flourishes about equal sovereignty, powers
reserved to the States and the constitutional guaran-
tee of small ‘‘r’’ republican governance.15
As it presses this constitutional argument, how-
ever, Texas has also been advancing several exceed-
ingly narrow constructions of its current obligations
under the VRA. In 2012 alone, for example, Texas
has argued, inter alia, that the VRA permits the
State to implement electoral changes that have not
been precleared,16 without inquiry or regard as to
their effect,17 and that provide no increase in repre-
sentational opportunities for a minority population
that has vastly increased in size.18 These are all
extreme positions and all have been rejected in
recent federal court rulings.19
Consider, first, Texas’s claim, pressed earlier
this year in Perez v. Perry,20 that it should be
allowed to implement new districting plans that
had yet to be precleared—and about which serious
questions had been raised as to their validity. Texas
advanced this aggressively narrow reading of the
statute after the district court in which it was seek-
ing preclearance announced it would not issue a
ruling in time for the 2012 primary elections.21
Interim districting plans were needed and a vitri-
olic fight ensued regarding their content.22 By Jan-
uary 2012, Texas was before the Supreme Court
telling the Justices that the State’s recently enacted
redistricting plans should be used as the interim
plans, at least until that knotty preclearance pro-
cess worked its way to closure,23 or perhaps was
itself declared unconstitutional.24
This argument would have done away with one
of the VRA’s most powerful features in a highly
consequential case and perhaps well beyond it.
What has long made preclearance not simply an
‘‘inventive’’25 remedy but an effective one as well
is that it bans implementation of unprecleared
changes. This ban displaces the presumption of
legitimacy that otherwise attaches to legislative
action and places the burden of proof on covered
jurisdictions to prove proposed electoral changes
are nondiscriminatory before they are imple-
mented.26 The goal is to prevent backsliding in the
participatory opportunities afforded to minority
voters.27
Whether or not contemporary conditions con-
tinue to justify this burden shifting mechanism is
the subject of considerable debate, and the Supreme
Court may soon decide that the statute has outlasted
the conditions that once justified its imposition. But
that question was not directly at issue in Perez when
Texas asserted authority to implement unprecleared
redistricting plans as interim plans. That is, the
State’s argument threatened to render the statute a
12See First Amended Complaint, Texas v. Holder, supra note 1.
13See, e.g., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012) cert. granted 2012 WL 3018430 (Nov. 9,
2012); LaRoque v. Holder, 679 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009).
14See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Shelby County v. Holder, 2011
WL 6282146 (C.A.D.C.).
15See First Amended Complaint, Texas v. Holder, supra note 1,
at Parts D, E, and F.
16See infra notes 20–29 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
18See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text.
19See Perez v. Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); Texas v. Holder,
2012 WL 3743676 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012); Texas v. United
States, 2012 WL 3671924 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2012).
20132 S. Ct. 934 (2012).
21See id. at 940.
22Tex. Redistricting, < http://txredistricting.org> (last vis-
ited May 10, 2012) (collecting a number of documents, includ-
ing briefs, court opinions, and statements by government
officials, relating to redistricting in Texas, many of which
note misconduct and bad faith on the part of many involved
parties).
23See Brief for Appellant, State of Texas, Perry v. Perez, 2011
WL 6468711 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) (Dec. 21, 2011).
24See Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted 2012 WL 3018430 (Nov. 9,
2012).
25See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).
26See S. Rep. No. 97–417, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 177, 183 (1982) (‘‘The effectiveness of sec-
tion 5 rests in part on the fact that a submitting jurisdiction bears
the burden of showing that a proposed modification is not dis-
criminatory in purpose or effect.’’).
27See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328 (pre-
clearance regime is meant to ‘‘shift the advantage of time and
inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims’’); see
also Reno v. Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter,
J,. dissenting) (noting regime’s purpose to prevent covered
jurisdictions from ‘‘pour[ing] old poison into new bottles’’).
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nullity, without a constitutional decision so holding,
and in the context of an expedited, interlocutory rul-
ing in a messy, discursively-briefed case.28 The Jus-
tices seemed to recognize the sweeping nature of
what Texas was seeking, both by making explicit
at oral argument that ‘‘the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 5 was not at issue,’’ and by denying Texas the
authority it sought to implement its districting
plans precisely as enacted.29
Texas’s aggressive stance towards the VRA has
also met resistance in the lower federal courts. In
August 2012, a three-judge panel flatly rejected
Texas’s claim that its new voter ID is VRA compli-
ant, while a separate three-judge panel agreed with
DOJ that several of the State’s new redistricting
plans should not be precleared.
The voter ID case is Texas v. Holder, in which the
State is also pressing the claim that the VRA is
unconstitutional. The recent ruling is limited to
the State’s statutory claims, and specifically, Tex-
as’s argument that DOJ erred both in finding the
State’s voter ID measure would make voting more
difficult for minority voters in Texas,30 and in think-
ing that such an impact, were it to exist, would be
grounds to block implementation of the voter ID
measure. According to Texas, the VRA’s discrimi-
natory effects prong should not apply to measures
like voter ID,31 and such measures should be imple-
mented absent evidence they were enacted with
racially discriminatory intent.32
The lower court ruling rejected these claims.
Finding ‘‘everything Texas has submitted as affir-
mative evidence [to be] unpersuasive, invalid, or
both,’’33 the panel concluded that Texas failed to
establish that its voter ID measure is nondiscrimina-
tory in effect, which in this context means the mea-
sure does not cause retrogression, or make things
worse, for minority voters. The panel, moreover,
emphasized that the problem was not simply the
State’s inability to ‘‘prove a negative,’’ but also the
fact that ‘‘uncontested record evidence conclusively
shows that the implicit costs of obtaining SB
14-qualifying ID will fall most heavily on the
poor and that a disproportionately high percentage
of African-Americans and Hispanics in Texas live
in poverty.’’34
The federal court was even less impressed with
Texas’s ‘‘primary’’ claim, namely, that the voter
ID should be precleared absent evidence it was en-
acted ‘‘on account of’’ or ‘‘because’’ of the race of
those it targets. Calling this argument ‘‘entirely
unpersuasive,’’ the panel said that it ignored the his-
tory that prompted enactment of the VRA in the first
instance, Congress’s explicit intent, the statute’s
plain language, and decades of precedent interpret-
ing it.35 Indeed, the panel said the idea that voter ID
might be immune from discriminatory effects anal-
ysis ‘‘completely misses the point of section 5.’’36
That ruling issued just two days after a separate
three-judge panel decision in Texas v. United States,
which concluded that Texas’s new redistricting
plans are not entitled to preclearance. From the
start, this dispute has focused on whether the
State has drawn a sufficient number of districts in
which minority voters exercise controlling influ-
ence. The VRA has long been read to require that,
under certain conditions, minority voters be concen-
trated in particular electoral districts so that they are
able to elect representatives of choice.37 Texas did
not directly contest this controversial requirement,
but instead, insisted that the new districting plans
provided minority voters all that they are entitled
to receive under the statute.
The dispute is a complex one, involving multiple
parties and claims addressing three separate district-
ing plans. For present purposes, however, it is suffi-
cient to consider one contested issue: namely,
whether, under the VRA, Texas’s new congressional
districting plan must include more districts in which
28See Texas Goes Big—Asks for Legislature’s Maps to Be Used
in 2012 Elections, Citing Tight Schedule, < http://txredistricting
.org/post/14579141904/texas-goes-big-asks-for-legislatur> .
29See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); but cf. Richard
Hasen, Breaking News: Supreme Court Decides Texas Redis-
tricting Case, Reverses Lower Court, Election L. Blog ( Jan.
20, 2012, 7:25AM), < http://electionlawblog.org/?p= 28312 >
(describing decision as a ‘‘big win’’ for Texas).
30See Letter, Tom Perez, Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, to Keith Ingram, Director of Elections, Elections Divi-
sions, Office of the Texas Secretary of State, Mar. 12, 2012
(stating that Latino voters comprise a disproportionate share
of the more than 600,000 (or, perhaps, far more) voters believed
to lack the identification the new law requires; that they face
distinct obstacles obtaining the identification cards issued by
the State’s Department of Public Safety; and that Texas had
failed to enact even rudimentary measures that would educate
these voters about the ID requirement and otherwise foster com-
pliance with it).
31See First Amended Complaint, Texas v. Holder, supra note 1.
32See id.
33Texas v. Holder, 2012 WL 3743676 (D.D.C.) Aug. 30, 2012,
at *26.
34Id. at *30.
35Id. at *33.
36Id. at *10.
37See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Latino voters enjoy controlling influence than did
the prior plan. Texas has argued that the VRA
requires only that the new plan contain the same
number of ‘‘safe’’ Latino districts as did the prior
plan, and that it does not require the State to
increase that number.38
What makes this claim both controversial and
aggressive is that the population of Texas has
grown substantially since the State adopted the
last set of districting plans, and most of that growth
occurred in the Latino community.39 Indeed, Texas
might well have lost a congressional seat, rather
than gained four, absent the growth in the State’s
Latino population.40 Texas nevertheless maintains
that the VRA requires that the State do nothing
more than maintain, and pointedly, not reduce, the
number of Latino ability districts.
There is authority supporting this proposition.
The VRA is explicit that it provides no right to pro-
portional representation, and precedent makes clear
that the statute does not require that covered states
mechanically add minority-controlled seats each
time population shifts increase the size of their con-
gressional delegation.41 Fifteen years ago, for
example, the Court upheld a redistricting plan
from Georgia that provided a single district in
which African-American voters were a majority,
where the prior plan also had had only one such dis-
trict. While the additional congressional seat Geor-
gia had been awarded in the interim meant black
voters had proportionally less influence under the
new plan, Abrams v. Johnson held that the VRA’s
ban on retrogression required that States maintain
only the absolute, rather than proportional, number
of minority opportunity districts.42
Texas relied heavily on the Georgia case and
argued that the disputed districting plans are VRA
compliant, and Abrams v. Johnson is why the district
court initially concluded on summary judgment that
the Texas plans were not retrogressive in effect
under the VRA.43 Still, the court observed that Geor-
gia had not experienced the sort of population growth
Texas has seen, and whatever the VRA mandate is
with regard to practices that have discriminatory
effects, Texas’s refusal to provide Latino voters any
increase in their proportional share of representa-
tional opportunities under contemporary conditions
raises a serious question of discriminatory intent.44
The three-judge panel in Texas v. United States
unanimously held that the congressional plan had,
in fact, been enacted with discriminatory intent,
and that the plan turned out to be discriminatory
in effect as well.45 On the latter point, the court
said that the arguments presented at trial left it con-
vinced that Texas’s failure to include a newminority
district among the four new districts in the enacted
plan made it retrogressive under the specific facts
of this case.46
Standing alone, that finding meant the congressio-
nal plan was not entitled to preclearance, but the
panel nevertheless proceeded to find that the plan
had been enacted with discriminatory intent as
well. The panel observed that state officials had
‘‘consciously’’ replaced active Latino voters in an
ability district with low turnout ones, in order ‘‘to
reduce’’ Latino influence ‘‘without making it
look like anything.had changed’’; that officials
removed critical economic centers and the incum-
bents’ district offices from three African-American
districts, while performing no comparable ‘‘surgery’’
on Anglo districts; that state officials excluded Latino
and African-American congressional representatives
from the drafting process, even though they solicited
and implemented the preferences of Anglo members
of Congress; and that the State offered little opportu-
nity for public review and challenge to the plan.47
Texas attributed these disputed moves and
process irregularities to ‘‘coincidence’’ and per-
haps ‘‘blithe indifference’’ to minority interests, as
opposed to discriminatory intent. The court, how-
ever, deemed these explanations ‘‘not credible’’
38See Texas v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C.
2011).
39See id. at 268.
40Id.
41See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Bush v.
Vera 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
42Abrams, 521 U.S. at 97–98 (rejecting the notion that ‘‘each
time a State with a majority-minority district [is] allowed to
add one new district because of population growth, it would
have to be majority-minority’’ as something ‘‘the Voting Rights
Act does not require’’).
43831 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
44Id.
45Texas v. United States, 2012 WL 3671924 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,
2012).
46More specifically, the panel found that, while the VRA does
not guarantee proportional representation, Texas’s failure to
create a Latino ability district among the four new congressio-
nal seats it was awarded significantly increased the prior plan’s
representation gap, a reference to the difference between what
proportional representation would yield and number of districts
actually drawn. The panel pointed out that no comparable
increase occurred in Georgia on the facts of Abrams. Id. at *18.
47Id. at *18 *21.
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and instead found itself ‘‘persuaded by the totality
of the evidence that the plan was enacted with dis-
criminatory intent.’’48
Consider whether this ruling would have issued
had Texas opted to provide Latino voters controlling
influence in just one of the new congressional dis-
tricts it had been awarded. To be sure, such a
move would not have enabled Texas to avoid the lit-
igation it has faced since adopting its redistricting
plans. Still, the move might have signaled to the dis-
trict court (and, perhaps, beyond) that the Latino
community is able to exert a degree of influence
through the political process that the preclearance
process itself assumes is generally lacking. Had
Texas provided Latino voters controlling influence
in just one additional district, it would have signaled
its recognition that the Latino community should
share at least some of the benefits its population
growth has brought to the State. As it stands,
Texas opted to give the Latino population nothing,
a move the federal district court found to violate
the VRA and involve the sort of intentional discrim-
ination Texas insists no longer occurs.
B. Expanding affirmative action
As Texas has been pressing aggressively narrow
constructions of the VRA, it is also pursuing an
aggressively expansive vision of what constitutes
permissible affirmative action under Grutter v.
Bollinger. Without doubt, all race-based affirmative
action plans are vulnerable in the present Court,
which has lacked a majority supporting Grutter
since Justice O’Connor retired in 2005. But it is the
way in which the program at issue in Fisher differs
from the Michigan plan that makes it particularly sus-
ceptible to invalidation. Indeed, most of Abigail Fish-
er’s petition to the Supreme Court focused on the
ways in which UT’s program goes beyond the bound-
aries of what Grutter had deemed permissible.49
In particular, two aspects of the Texas program
are notably more expansive than was Michigan’s.
The first is the targeted way UT administrators use
racial criteria to promote racial diversity not only
in the entering class, but also at the classroom and
program level; the second is the University’s decision
to useGrutter’s ‘‘holistic review’’ in conjunction with
its 10% plan, under which UT guarantees admissions
to all students who graduate in the top 10% of their
high school class.50 Both aspects of the Texas pro-
gram raised concerns in the lower courts.
A solid argument exists that the benefits of diver-
sity identified in Grutter require extending some
affirmative action efforts to the classroom and pro-
gram level. Still, the means by which such diversity
is achieved involves targeted racial moves of a sort
likely to displease a majority of the Roberts Court.51
Indeed, most Justices on the present Court are openly
hostile to, or, at least deeply discomforted by, the rigid
use of race. Three explicitly dissented in Grutter,52
and five objected in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, which struck
down programs that relied on race-based student
assignments to foster diversity and avoid what school
administrators’ called ‘‘racial isolation.’’53 Given these
opinions and the charges of unconstitutional racial bal-
ancing they lodged, one can easily envision an opinion
striking down UT’s effort to achieve classroom level
diversity as requiring impermissible racial balancing.
So too, Texas’s decision to employ Grutter-
styled ‘‘holistic’’ review in conjunction with its
10% plan represents an expansive approach to the
prior precedent. Here, the expansiveness of what
Texas is doing lies not in the arguable rigidity
with which the State is using racial criteria, but
instead with its insistence that it needs to use race
at all. True, Texas has a solid argument that, stand-
ing alone, the 10% plan offers an inadequate substi-
tute for the flexibility and individualized attention
promised by Grutter’s holistic rule. And yet, the
fact that UT admits a greater proportion of minority
students under the 10% plan than outside of it will
fuel concern that Texas’s use of race beyond the
10% plan is not absolutely necessary to achieve
the diversity of the sort Grutter protects.54
48Id. at *21.
49See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S.) (Sept. 15, 2011).
50See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 644 F.3d 301 (5th
Cir. 2011) ( Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition
for rehearing en banc); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially concurring).
51See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 551U.S. 701 (2007).
52539 U.S. 306, 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 349 ( Justice
Thomas, dissenting); id. at 378 (Rehnquist, C.J., with whom
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas join, dissenting); id. at
387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53551 U.S. 701.
54See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 644 F.3d 301 (5th
Cir. 2011) ( Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition
for rehearing en banc); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially concurring).
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Back in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy’s crit-
ical concurring opinion complained that the school
districts’ race-based policies did little to foster the
diversity school administrators sought. 55 In Fisher,
a similar complaint is easily anticipated. If the
facially race-neutral 10% plan more effectively fos-
ters diversity than an overtly race-conscious one,
why not rely on, or, if necessary, expand the former
instead of employing less effective racial criteria to
achieve the same purpose? To be sure, good cause
may exist to use a more targeted approach to locate
students for programs in which diversity is mani-
festly lacking and remains lacking under the 10%
plans. Still, using the programs in conjunction
with one another has, not unexpectedly, given rise
to charges questioning their necessity.
III. WHY LESS IS MORE
Texas is widely expected to lose in Fisher while
the constitutional claim it is pressing in Holder is
thought likely to prevail either in Holder itself or,
more likely, in the case now pending before the
Supreme Court.56 These expectations rest less on
the particular details of the Texas cases than on
well-founded perceptions about judicial antipathy
to race-based programs like affirmative action and
statutes like the VRA. No one should be surprised
if both affirmative action and the VRA fail to sur-
vive the pending cases.
I nevertheless think that Texas would be more
likely to succeed with both claims than it now is
had it opted to press less expansive and aggressive
positions in each. This suggestion, to be sure, is
both speculative and non-falsifiable (unless, of
course, the Court in its decision were to say so,
which it won’t). To support my speculation, I will
briefly discuss some other cases in which I think
the outcomes hinged on the aggressive way a crucial
party pushed the limits of existing doctrine. But this
reading of precedent is similarly speculative, and,
accordingly, my suggestion regarding the Texas
cases remains just that, namely, a suggestion. My
interest, however, is not in presenting scientific
proof, but instead to invite consideration of the
ways in which pushing for less may ultimately be
a better way to achieve more.
Consider the example the Supreme Court set a
half-century ago when it decided to enter the
famed ‘‘political thicket’’ and address the rampant
mal-apportionment that then characterized Ameri-
can elections. That foray yielded the one-person,
one-vote doctrine, a principle that is now so in-
grained as constitutional truth that students today
often have difficulty grasping what made it once
controversial or why it should still be so understood.
And yet, the Court’s decisions to entertain the
challenge in 1962 and thereafter to endorse equal
apportionment were hardly preordained. Not all
that long before Baker v. Carr, a majority of the Jus-
tices seemed adamant that they would not get
involved.57
But then the Alabama legislature voted to place
all but four of Tuskegee’s African-American resi-
dents outside city limits. The legislation chang-
ing the city’s boundaries issued shortly after an
African-American administrator at the renowned
Tuskegee Institute nearly won a seat on the city’s
school board in a town that had been majority
black (at least before the Alabama legislature got
to work on it) and in which literacy tests were prov-
ing increasingly ineffective means to disenfranchise
a highly-educated African-American population.58
Alabama’s purpose in drawing the new, tortuous
boundaries was clear, even absent any explicit state-
ment as to its intent. At the time, moreover, Alaba-
ma’s action appeared permissible, or at least
immune from challenge, given the Justices’ voiced
disinterest in reviewing municipal or electoral
boundaries.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot nevertheless struck down
the Alabama law. The ruling’s Fifteenth Amend-
ment focus was likely designed to limit the deci-
sion’s reach, but in many senses, Gomillion
opened the door for the Court to reconsider its
hands-off approach to questions of apportionment
more generally.59 Two years later, Baker v. Carr
announced the Court was willing to consider
whether the Constitution might be violated by a
Tennessee apportionment plan that allotted an
urban district ten times the population of a rural
one.60 Reynolds v. Sims followed quickly, if not
55551 U.S. at 783–88.
56See supra note 13.
57See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
58See generally Bernard Taper, Gomillion Versus Light-
foot: The Right to Vote in Apartheid Alabama (2003).
59See, e.g.,BernardGrofman, Controversies inMinority
Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 165
(1992).
60369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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inexorably, fromBaker and announced the one-person,
one-vote principle.61
In the years since, the Court has applied that prin-
ciple relentlessly, and, some might say, absurdly.
The 1983 decision Karcher v. Daggett62 notoriously
found a one-person, one-vote violation in a redis-
tricting plan with a population deviation smaller
than the census undercount, and, more recently, a
federal district court in Pennsylvania struck down
a state-wide districting plan for a nineteen-person
deviation.63 Whatever the wisdom in such holdings,
I suspect that foundational decisions like Baker and
Reynolds (and indeed Gomillion before them)
would never have issued had they involved only
nominal deviations or population shifts. That is, it
was the extreme population deviation disputed in
Baker and Reynolds, and the removal of virtually
every African-American resident from Tuskegee
that propelled the Justices to act.
On one view, of course, this need not have been
the case. Insofar as questions of districting and
apportionment are ‘‘political’’ questions that federal
judges purportedly lack competency to assess, legis-
lators should have enjoyed carte blanche to draw (or
let stand) the lines as they saw fit, subject only to
such retribution as voters remained capable of
expressing through the political process. Put differ-
ently, as a matter of doctrine, extreme population
deviations should have raised no more concern—at
least in federal court—than minute ones. So too,
denying scores of black residents their ‘‘pre-existing
municipal vote’’64 should have been no more objec-
tionable than denying that vote to just a few of them.
As it happened, attorneys in both cases were
asked about precisely this point, and these lawyers
insisted that their claims would be no different
had the state action involved been less extreme. In
fact, plaintiff’s counsel in Baker readily acknowl-
edged his intention to challenge any population
deviation, not only the extreme ones.65 Similarly,
Charles Gomillion’s lawyer, Fred Gray, insisted
the constitutional violation in the case lay in the
removal of African-American residents based on
their race, not in the number of residents removed.66
And yet, I doubt that Gomillion, Baker, and Rey-
nolds would have been decided as they were had the
underlying state action involved less extreme con-
duct and thus had less aggressively challenged the
limits of existing doctrine. It was the magnitude of
that action (or extreme consequences of inaction)
that ultimately swayed a majority of the Court to
get involved. Had the apportionment scheme in
Baker fallen short of equality by some less egregious
degree, or if Tuskegee’s new municipal boundaries
eliminated significantly fewer African-American res-
idents, the Justices might well have stayed out of the
fray. In other words, had the state officials exercised
their discretion less aggressively, they might have
retained more of the discretion they sought.
That is not to suggest that gross mal-apportionment
would have persisted indefinitely, or that exiling a
municipality’s minority population would still be per-
missible so long as a nontrivial number of residents
remain within city limits. Doctrine would have cer-
tainly developed, but both the path and substance of
that development would likely have been different,
and the pivotal moments other than the ones we had,
had the state officials involved opted to temper the dis-
cretion they exercised.
The same is true in other contexts. The Rehnquist
Court, for instance, might never have intervened in
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny absent its conviction
that the public officials involved had exercised
their discretion too aggressively and pushed the lim-
its of existing doctrine too far.67 Before the Justices
got involved in these cases, state officials had rou-
tinely considered race, among other factors, when
drawing district lines. The only doctrinal constraint
was that resulting districts were not to cause racial
vote dilution within the meaning of the Constitution
or the Voting Rights Act.68
The round of redistricting that followed the 1990
census, however, yielded a host of intricate, oddly
shaped, racially informed districts that were pro-
duced, at least in part, because the Department of
Justice had insisted that particular states increase
participatory opportunities for minority voters.
61377 U.S. 533 (1964).
62462 U.S. 725 (1983).
63See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532 (M.D. Pa.
2002).
64Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. at 341.
65See Stephen Ansolabehere and Samuel Issacharoff, The Story
of Baker v. Carr, in Constitutional Law Stories 271
(Michael Dorf, ed. 2d ed. 2009).
66See Samuel Issacharoff, et al., The Law of Democracy
(4th ed. 2012).
67See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
68See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
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The Court became convinced that DOJ was un-
yieldingly seeking the creation of black majority-
minority districts wherever possible.69 To curb this
behavior, the Justices identified a new, analytically
distinct injury under the Equal Protection Clause
stemming from the excessive use of race in the dis-
tricting process absent compelling justification.70
The Court struggled with the Shaw doctrine through-
out the 1990s, with many observers and even some of
the Justices condemning it as unworkable and incoher-
ent.71 Closure came somewhat unexpectedly with the
Court’s decision in Hunt v. Cromartie, a much criti-
cized holding that nevertheless offered what came to
be seen as a roadmap for avoiding liability under
Shaw.72 Tone down references to race, Cromartie sug-
gested, and liability under Shaw could be avoided.73
That admonition is, for present purposes, what
distinguishes Shaw and its progeny from Baker
and Reynolds. While one-person, one-vote elimi-
nated entirely the discretion that had produced
vast population disparities between districts, the
Shaw injury evolved so as to map precisely onto
the very conduct that prompted the Court to identify
an injury in the first place. Notably, the Shaw doc-
trine does not excise race from the districting pro-
cess. Moreover, in stark contrast to other contexts
in which race is considered, Shaw does not subject
districting decisions that rely on race to strict scru-
tiny. Instead, it is only the excessive, or predominant,
use of race that triggers exacting review,74 just as it
was the excessive use of race (or the perception of
such use), that first convinced the Court something
was awry in the redistricting process. The doctrinal
rule in Shaw circumscribed but ultimately preserved
a degree of discretion by those it regulates. Reynolds
eliminated discretion entirely. It is, in particular, this
latter move that I want to focus on here.
More specifically, when does the aggressive
exercise of discretion backfire and lawful discretion
get pressed so far that discretion is subsequently
eliminated? A gratuitous assertion of authority to
ban books propelled the Court in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission to eliminate
entirely the basis for both the regulatory conduct
actually in dispute and the discretion the agency
imagined itself authorized to exercise.75 And yet,
a perceived failure of deliberation, and hence dis-
cretion poorly exercised, on the part of Congress
led the Court in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District No. 1 v. Holder to find a statutory amend-
ment that had not previously existed, and thereby
sidestep, albeit, not for long a looming, constitu-
tional question and the exercise of congressional
discretion it implicates.76
It is, of course, this constitutional question that is
now pending before the Supreme Court. It also is the
question Texas is pursuing inHolder, alongside several
aggressively narrow constructions of the VRA and a
decidedly expansive view of affirmative action. These
varied positions are all controversial and the persua-
siveness of the arguments marshaled in their support
hinges largely on the degree to which one already
admires or dislikes the VRA and affirmative action.
Still, their resolution is also sure to be shaped by the
aggressive stance Texas is pursuing in these cases.
In Fisher, there are solid—perhaps even persua-
sive—arguments that support crafting an affirmative
action plan theway Texas has done at UT. Still, a pro-
gram that more closely tracked the Michigan Law
plan upheld in Grutter would be less vulnerable
today. True, the Court’s aversion to affirmative action
may be such that no race-based plan, even one far
more limited than Texas’s, would be able to dodge,
much less survive, scrutiny. And yet, the Justices
might well have opted against review had Texas
crafted a plan that mirrored—rather than expanded
upon—the plan Grutter so narrowly upheld.
In Holder, Texas’s claim that the VRA is both
obsolete and unconstitutional seeks to operational-
ize a view Governor Perry expressed during his
short-lived bid for the Republican Party’s presiden-
tial nomination.77 Candidates for federal office
have, at least in recent years, shied away from con-
demning the ‘‘crown jewel’’ of the civil rights
movement,78 but Governor Perry is not alone in
69See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A
Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand
and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 105–06 (2000).
70See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
71See Issacharoff, supra note 66.
72Id.
73Id.
74See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are
Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only
When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U.
Miami L. Rev. 489 (2002).
75130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
76557 U.S. 193 (2009).
77 < http://video.foxnews.com/v/1395805419001/perry-south-
carolina-is-at-war-with-federal-government > .
78See, e.g., Pres. Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Vot-
ing Rights Act Amendments of 1982 ( June 29, 1982), avail-
able at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/
62982b.htm > .
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thinking the VRA invalid, and a number of credible
arguments support that position.
The claim, however, is not strengthened by Tex-
as’s decision to couple it with a series of aggres-
sively narrow constructions of the statute. True,
such constructions might facially seem compatible
with a constitutional challenge. After all, why
endure, much less endorse, broad applications of a
statutory regime a litigant believes to be invalid,
particularly when more narrow constructions offer
reviewing courts the means to limit the regime’s
reach absent a constitutional holding?79
This stance, however, becomes deeply problem-
atic when the statute at issue is the VRA. The
VRA’s regional provisions rest on the premise that
the political processes in covered jurisdictions
would not be open, accessible, and responsive to
the interests of protected minority groups absent
the oversight the statute provides. While opponents
of the VRA vigorously contest this premise, Texas
has done a good deal to bolster that claim through
both the miserly readings of the VRA it has recently
pressed and the conduct those readings seek to
validate.
More specifically, the contention that minority
voters in Texas can adequately fend for themselves
in the political process is undercut by Texas’s insis-
tence that its new voter ID law is nondiscriminatory
within the meaning of the VRA. As the lower fed-
eral court noted in Texas v. Holder, Texas failed
to supplement the new ID requirement with mea-
sures relating to education and access that might
have eased the disproportionate burden the new
law places on African-American and Latino vot-
ers.80 What’s more, the State coupled that failure
with its insistence that the measure’s racially dispa-
rate impact is neither part of the discrimination
banned by the VRA nor, apparently, a cause for con-
cern among state officials.
So too, the notion that political processes are
open, accessible, and responsive to minority voters
is severely challenged by Texas’s insistence that
the new districting plans need not provide the La-
tino community any additional influence over
what it previously had, despite the massive growth
in that community’s size and the four new congres-
sional seats Texas received as a direct result of that
growth. True, Texas’s position finds some support in
precedent,81 and undoubtedly seeks to tap into judi-
cial dissatisfaction with the VRA’s group-based
mandates. And yet, the notion that the Latino voters
should get none of the benefits—indeed, the
spoils—that they enabled the State to receive chal-
lenges the notion that local political processes are
responsive to Latino interests.
That is not to say that Texas needed to provide
Latino voters controlling influence in all the new
seats, or even half of them. But by opting to deny
them control in any—the ‘‘inexorable zero,’’ so to
speak—Texas comes close to making the case it is
ostensibly seeking to refute. Including just one addi-
tional Latino-controlled congressional seat would
not have blocked the litigation in which Texas has
now long been mired, but it would have changed
its tenor considerably and perhaps led to a very dif-
ferent outcome than one reached by the lower court
in Texas v. United States.
The same is true with respect to voter ID. Texas
might have chosen to craft a very different voter
ID measure, one far more likely to have survived
scrutiny under the VRA. As it stands, the federal
court decision in Texas v. Holder described the
Texas provision’s ‘‘strict, unforgiving burdens’’
and called it ‘‘the most stringent in the country.’’82
The panel, moreover, emphasized that Texas
‘‘ignor[ed] warnings’’ about the ways in which the
voter ID requirement burdened both the poor and
racial minorities, and explicitly refused to craft
the requirement in ways that might mitigate those
burdens. Adopting such mitigating measures, the
panel suggested, ‘‘could have made this a far closer
case.’’83
Ultimately, Texas’s miserly readings of its obli-
gations under the VRA and the actions it seeks to
vindicate through those readings may prove to be
the best evidence for why the statute remains neces-
sary. Whether the State’s aggressively hostile stance
towards the VRA destabilizes judicial misgivings
about the statute remains to be seen. But that pros-
pect looks more plausible today than it once did pre-
cisely because Texas has opted to take such an
antagonistic approach towards the statute it seeks
to dismantle.
79See generally, Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
80See Letter, Tom Perez, Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, to Keith Ingram, Director of Elections, Elections Divi-
sions, Office of the Texas Secretary of State, Mar. 12, 2012.
81See supra notes and accompanying text.
82Texas v. Holder, 2012 WL 3743676, at *32.
83Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The most interesting cases, and the ones most fun
to teach, are often those in which the outcome, or a
critical step in the chain of reasoning, seems inordi-
nately sweeping or unduly intrusive or simply unex-
pected. What makes such cases interesting, and
fodder for good discussions, is that they invite
us to look beyond the text of an opinion to under-
stand what is going on. The text by itself is inade-
quate explanation, and, hence, we must speculate.
Therein lies the fun. Typically, there are multiple,
plausible explanations; some are competing, others
co-existing, and, typically, none is demonstrably
right. A suspicion the decision is outcome driven
invariably surfaces, and yet, that preferred result
is frequently obtainable without the sweeping or
even troublesome moves used to bring it about.
A distinct explanation, however, may best cap-
ture a host of these decisions. Namely, judges are
apt to rule in unexpected and expansive ways
when reviewing decisions they perceive to over-
reach and to press lawful discretion too far. In
fact, judges are wont to respond to overreaching by
overreaching themselves. They are typically fully
aware that they are doing so and convinced that
doing so is the most responsible stance given the cir-
cumstances.
None of this means that conduct challenging the
limits of established discretion is always ill-advised.
Some such moves will evade review or wind up
passing muster, thereby expanding the discretionary
realm and perhaps attracting a mild admonition to
be mindful of boundaries in the future.84 Other con-
duct challenging the limits of the permissible will be
invalidated but with narrow rulings that reaffirm or
more carefully demarcate the boundaries restricting
the lawful exercise of discretion. But there also are
those cases in which disputed conduct presses law-
ful discretion so far that the discretion at issue gets
eliminated entirely.
The aggressive stance Texas has taken with
regard to both the VRA and affirmative action
risks falling into this latter category. In Fisher, the
State’s approach is likely to fuel the disdain many
Justices have already voiced regarding affirmative
action.85 In Holder, by contrast, the State’s stance
may—and indeed should—challenge existing judi-
cial misgivings about the statute.
The Roberts Court has already voiced consider-
able skepticism about the ongoing need for the
VRA’s regional, remedial provisions,86 and the
Justices appear poised to strike down a regime
long viewed as a significant but necessary con-
straint on local discretion. Texas’s uncompromising
approach to the regime, and the recent federal court
decisions condemning it, may slow their momen-
tum. The conduct the State has sought to validate
through it aggressively narrow readings of the
VRA raises serious doubts as to whether Texas
has secured the conditions it insists exist and render
the VRA obsolete.
It is possible, of course, that Texas may yet benefit
from appellate rulings that deem its conduct to be
VRA compliant, or ones that instruct the State to
take some modest steps that would secure such com-
pliance. So too, no one should be surprised if the
State winds up party to, or simply partaking in, a rul-
ing that invalidates the statute in its entirety. But
should the Roberts Court defy expectations and con-
clude that the VRA is still doing important work, I
think Texas will be largely responsible. Had the
State pushed for less, it would stand a better chance
of securingmore of the discretion it professes to seek.
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